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ABSTRACT
This paper provides the first analysis on the feasibility of Return-
Oriented programming (ROP) on RISC-V, a new instruction set
architecture targeting embedded systems. We show the existence
of a new class of gadgets, using several Linear Code Sequences And
Jumps (LCSAJ), undetected by current Galileo-based ROP gadget
searching tools.
We argue that this class of gadgets is rich enough on RISC-V
to mount complex ROP attacks, bypassing traditional mitigation
like DEP, ASLR, stack canaries, G-Free and some compiler-based
backward-edge CFI, by jumping over any guard inserted by a com-
piler to protect indirect jump instructions.
We provide examples of such gadgets, as well as a proof-of-
concept ROP chain, using C code injection to leverage a privilege
escalation attack on two standard Linux operating systems. Addi-
tionally, we discuss some of the required mitigations to prevent
such attacks and provide a new ROP gadget finder algorithm that
handles this new class of gadgets.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Embedded systems security; Mal-
ware and its mitigation; Operating systems security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Memory corruption vulnerabilities are one of the most popular
entry points for hackers to hijack a program. Amongst them, stack
overflow attacks have been popular since 1996 [2]. It was for long
thought that the hacker would always inject some standalone pay-
load, that could be detected as malicious as such, using methods
such as executable space protection [29]. This assumption has been
invalidated by Return-Oriented Programming (ROP), introduced on
par with the Galileo detection algorithm by Shacham in 2007 [43],
proving, as formulated by Dino Dai Zovi in 2010, that “prevent-
ing the introduction of malicious code is not enough to prevent the
execution of malicious computations” [51].
Since then, many countermeasures have been developed against
ROP attacks [17, 19, 34, 35]. Each time, the publication of new
ROP variants, such as JOP, SROP, SOP, or even JIT-spray [9, 10, 12,
38] bypassed those stopgap mitigations. At the same time, these
attacks have been extended to many architectures, including much
simpler Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) [13], confirming
that those design flaws are widespread among all architectures.
State-of-the-art mitigation methods such as gcc’s -mmitigate-rop
option or G-Free [34], tend to uproot such attacks by detecting and
eliminating any code section that could be reused by an attacker,
in the hope that the remaining gadgets would not be sufficient
to mount complex attacks. Other even more radical methods like
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) try preventing arbitrary control-flow
transfers by validating the target of indirect jumps [1, 27, 39], often
at the cost of performance, thus reducing their usability [14, 16].
Likewise, these methods do hardly more than increasing the
cost of such attacks, as it may be sufficient to find new unexpected
gadgets to get back to step one of stack overflow exploitation. In this
paper, we show once again, how to challenge the existing security
mechanisms using a new class of gadgets that are undetected by
the vast majority of published methods, based on the well-known
Galileo algorithm.We explain how to produce such gadgets in RISC-
V [49], a new Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) which development
began in 2010. Consequently, an attacker may be able to insert such
gadgets in an open source program and exploit them unnoticed.
RISC-V is based on the concept of RISC [37], targeting simplicity
by providing few and limited computer instructions. RISC ISAs have
become increasingly popular with the wide adoption of embedded
devices such as smartphones, tablets, or other Internet of Things
devices. The most popular RISC ISAs are currently ARM [6], Atmel
AVR [7], MIPS [30], Power [25], and SPARC [45].
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RISC-V is the fifth RISC ISA published by UC Berkeley. It is com-
pletely free and open-source, with its User-Level ISA published in
May 2017 in version 2.2. It features 32-bit and 64-bit little-endian
variants (designated as RV32 and RV64), with a future extension
to 128 bits. While only expensive test boards feature RISC-V pro-
cessors currently, many companies including Western Digital or
Nvidia have announced the use of RISC-V chips in their future
products [41]. Hence, this architecture is of particular interest for
such attacks, as most programs are in the process of being ported
to this architecture, leaving the insertion of backdoors easy for an
ill-intentioned programmer.
We summarize our contributions as follows.
(1) We provide the first analysis on the feasibility of ROP attacks
on the new RISC-V architecture.
(2) We introduce a new and stealthy class of ROP gadgets, un-
detected by all previously published methods based on the
Galileo algorithm.
(3) We show the achievability of complex ROP attacks using
this class of gadgets on RISC-V ISA, under the assumption of
malicious C source code insertion generating such gadgets.
(4) We implement a proof-of-concept backdoored SUID program
allowing privilege escalation on two standard Linux operat-
ing systems running on RISC-V, with every available ROP
mitigation mechanism enabled.
(5) We present a new algorithm able to find ROP gadgets of this
class and discuss the plausibility of their presence in existing
RISC-V binaries.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly introduce the key concepts related to
this paper’s scope-of-work and contributions. More particularly,
we describe the memory corruption exploitation technique known
as Return-Oriented Programming and detail some RISC-V features,
later used in the paper.
2.1 Return-Oriented Programming
The first methods aiming at exploiting memory corruption bugs
were as simple as a straightforward data injection into the program,
which would end up being executed by the processor [2]. The
introduction of Data Execution Prevention (DEP) [29] made those
attacks almost impossible, as injected data could not be executed
anymore. In this battle between the shield and the sword, Return-
Oriented Programming (ROP) has been the answer from malware
developers. The first ROP attack was publicly presented in 2001 by
Nergal in Phrack [32].
As shown by Fig. 1, it bypasses DEP by injecting in the stack a
succession of call frames. Each call framewill result in the execution
of a gadget: a small snippet of legitimate code containing a small
number of instructions ended by a ret. When the ret instruction
is reached, the address of the next gadget is popped from the stack
into the program counter. Provided that enough different gadgets
are available in the executable, arbitrary code may be executed by
chaining those gadgets.
Two categories of gadgets can be distinguished. The first one
using only legitimate code written by the programmer, also called
the Main Execution Path (MEP). The second category uses overlap-
ping code, called Hidden Execution Path (HEP), i.e. code sections
that have another interpretation by the CPU depending on its in-
ternal status (32 or 64 bits, Thumb mode, or on the offset at which
the execution has started). The latter has the advantage of bypass-
ing any compiler-added stack protection mechanism, presenting a
wider variety of side-effects and being undetectable by traditional
linear or recursive disassemblers, which only handle the MEP of a
program.
The first academic paper studying this technique was published
in 2007 by Shacham [43], in which he presents ROP on x86 and
the Galileo algorithm, which allows the detection of gadgets in any
executable memory region. It is based on a backward disassembly
method, starting from every return instruction, and then trying to
recursively bruteforce the length of the previous instruction. This
provides a tree of possible gadgets all ending with a return.
The most common attack scheme consists in scanning the exe-
cutable sections of the binary with Galileo based [15, 26, 50] or with
other ad hoc algorithms [42] to find gadgets which are thereupon
used to devise a ROP chain performing the required computation.
Intermediate languages are sometimes used, allowing the design
of higher-level ROP chains that are then compiled to the gadget
language [44, 50]. Finally, the payload is adapted to the injection
method, with techniques like padding, NUL bytes removal, or even
alphanumeric conversion, which are not within the scope of this
study.
stack frame
stack frame
stack frame
stack frame
padding
padding padding padding
local data
return address
gadget_1
return address
gadget_2
return address
gadget_3
local data
"/bin/sh"
return address
system_call
...
...
jal strcpy
...
ret
gadget_1
mv a1 ,0
mv a2 ,0
...
ret
gadget_2
mv a7 ,221
...
ret
gadget_3
mv a0,sp
...
ret
system_call
ecall
overflow
Figure 1: General principle of Return-Oriented Program-
ming attacks. The vulnerability shown here consists in a
buffer overflow fromanunchecked strcpy allowing the user
to smash the contents of the stack.
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By design, the Galileo algorithm is only able to find gadgets made
of a straight-line instruction sequence, with no jumps except for the
last instruction. Such a sequence is called a Linear Code Sequence
And Jump (LCSAJ). Gadgets spanning over several LCSAJs are thus
undetected by Galileo, and, to the best of our knowledge, have
never been subject to study in the context of ROP attacks.
2.2 RISC-V
RISC-V splits its instruction set between a mandatory core set
(RV64I) and different optional extensions, each of which is desig-
nated by a letter. The defined extensions include integer multiplica-
tion and division (M), atomic operations (A), single-, double- or quad-
precision (F, D, Q) floating-point operations, decimal floating-point
operations (L), compressed instructions (C), bit-manipulation (B),
just-in-time (J), transactional memory (T), packed-SIMD instruc-
tions (P), vector operations (V), and user-level interrupts (N). The
general purpose ISA, which includes IMAFD, is designated by the
letter G. In what follows, we focus on the RV64GC ISA, which is the
one agreed on by Debian and Fedora porters, as well as members
of the RISC-V Foundation. On top of that, the Foundation intends
to provide “a profile for standard RISC-V Unix platforms that will
include C extension as mandatory”.1
There are 31 general purpose 64-bit registers (x1-x31), 32 floating-
point registers (f0-f31), a program counter (pc), as well as various
control-and-status registers. The pseudo-register x0 designates the
zero constant. RISC-V provides a standard ELF Application Binary
Interface (ABI), called psABI [18], with the naming convention
provided in Fig. 2.
Register ABI Mnemonic Meaning
x0 zero Zero
x1 ra Return address
x2 sp Stack pointer
x3 gp Global pointer
x4 tp Thread pointer
x5-x7 t0-t2 Temporary registers
x8-x9 s0-s1 Callee-saved registers
x10-x17 a0-a7 Argument registers
x18-x27 s2-s11 Callee-saved registers
x28-x31 t3-t6 Temporary registers
Figure 2: Naming convention for registers, per RISC-V ELF
psABI.
While most RISC ISAs require naturally aligned instructions,
RV64GC features 32-bit and 16-bit instructions, aligned on 16 bits,
like in Thumb-2 extension introduced with ARMv6T2 [5]. Instruc-
tion length is encoded in the least-significant byte (hence with the
lowest address as RISC-V is little-endian): 16-bit instructions require
the last two bits to be different from 11 whereas 32-bit instructions
have their last two bits equal to 11 with the three previous bits
different from 111.
Combining those two peculiarities of RV64GC opens the door
to overlapping instructions, that can be obtained by either using
two 32-bit instructions 2 bytes apart (Fig. 3), or by using a 32-bit
1https://wiki.debian.org/RISC-V
13 4f 83 23
83 23 0b 00
00010011 01001111 10000011 00100011 00001011 00000000
xori t5,t1,568
lw t2,0(s6)
Figure 3: Two 32-bit overlapping instructions of I1 (little-
endian representation). Instruction length encoding for
each instruction is emphasized in blue.
13 0a 04 40
04 40
00010011 00001010 00000100 01000000
addi s4,s0,1024
lw s1,0(s0)
Figure 4: A 32-bit instruction of I2 whose last 2 bytes are also
a 16-bit valid instruction (little-endian representation)
instruction whose last 2 bytes are also a valid 16-bit compressed
instruction (Fig. 4). In what follows, we use I1 to designate the set
of 32-bits instructions allowing overlapping sequences, whereas
the set of 32-bit instructions whose last 2 bytes are valid 16-bit
instruction will be denoted by I2. Examples of overlapping for both
sets I1 and I2 are given in Fig. 3 and 4. Typically, an overlapping
sequence consists of several instructions of I1 chained together,
optionally ending with an instruction of I2.
3 THREAT MODEL AND ATTACK OVERVIEW
In this section, we explicit our target platforms, aiming run-of-the-
mill RISC-V systems with off-the-shelf ROP mitigations deployed.
We also present two attack scenarios taking advantage of our new
class of gadgets for improved concealment.
Our target platform features a standard Linux operating sys-
tem, such as Debian or Fedora, with two levels of privilege, that
we call user and root. Standard protections are deployed, such as
Address Space Layout Randomization and Data Execution Preven-
tion, that prevent common stack overflow exploits. Programs are
compiled with the standard gcc provided by the operating sys-
tem, adding gcc’s ROP mitigation mechanism using compiler flag
-fstack-protector-strong. Note that some other mitigation spe-
cific to x86 are not available on RISC-V, like gcc’s -mmitigate-rop
option or clang’s CFI. In Section 7, we discuss the ability of such
mitigations, if ported to RISC-V, to hamper attacks using this new
class of gadgets.
3.1 Closing (stealthily) the gap between
vulnerability and exploitation
The first attack scenario focuses on adding a backdoor to a program
leading to a ROP attack. Backdoors allow any person aware of their
existence to reach a privileged state upon a specific input. In order
to create a backdoor, two distinct elements must be stealthily in-
serted by an attacker: a trigger and a payload [46]. In our scenario,
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we assume the attacker already managed to insert a trigger (or
find an existing one), in the form of a ROP exec vulnerability: a
one-time memory write like a buffer overflow combined with an
arbitrary control-flow redirect, such as a return at the end of the
function, use-after-free, type confusion, or even corrupted instruc-
tion through fault injection [47]. Such vulnerabilities are pretty
common in programs, and are often rendered non exploitable by
reducing the number of available gadgets and by deploying ROP
mitigations, such as ASLR, stack canaries, backward-edge CFI, or
G-Free.
To lower the bar of exploitability, the attacker must embed gad-
gets in the payload of his backdoor, aiming at preventing any un-
aware outsider from stumbling upon those gadgets. As a stepping-
stone for future elaboration, we consider generic C code injection
through traditional backdooring, as we believe that one variant of
this scenario may target C++ Just-in-Time compilers (like Cling [48]
or ClangJIT [21], once they get ported to RISC-V) to mount JIT-
spraying attacks [23]. Indeed, identical assumptions are required
for the latter: code injection and ROP exec vulnerability.
As an illustration, we consider the case where the attacker has a
user privileged level access to the system, including shell, ability
to run programs, read access to binaries and libraries. The goal
of the attacker is to increase his privilege level to root, which in
practice thoroughly compromises the system by granting a read-
write access to the whole target. Such an attack is called a privilege
escalation attack, and is at the core of highly publicized attacks
such as iOS jailbreaking [20]. To that end, the attacker will use a
program that can be executed by the user, but running at a root
privilege level. Those programs are called SUID (Set owner User ID
up on execution), and are abundant on any system. Indeed, actions
as simple as changing a password, plugging a USB key or granting
root privilege for an authorized user require the execution of SUID
programs.
To backdoor such programs, the attacker may upstream under-
handed C code in some open-source project. Details on how to
achieve this have been provided by Gilbertson [24] and thoroughly
studied by Prati [40], with some examples provided in the Under-
handed C Contest and DEF CON’s Hiding backdoor in plain sight
contest. Here, the payload consists in a set of ROP gadgets that
span over several LCSAJs. Furthermore, those gadgets are using
overlapping techniques, so that only the last LCSAJ is in the MEP,
whereas all the previous ones are in the HEP, thus hiding them to
currently available ROP gadget searchers. To trigger the exploit
and gain root access, the attacker only has to execute the SUID
program with the adequate user input.
3.2 Creating a (concealed) persistent backdoor
on a compromised system
The second attack scenario leverages privilege escalation through
SUID to build a persistent backdoor in a compromised target. Per-
sistence is considered as a key step in a complex attack chain to
maintain access into compromised systems upon slight environ-
ment changes (reboot, updates, password change). This attack is
much easier to implement than inserting backdoors in highly scru-
tinized SUID programs, as it requires the attacker to only get a
one-time root access, and grant SUID permission to a program for
which he has knowledge of the existence of a privilege escalation
exploit. Such backdoors are quite common,2 as they involve modi-
fying the permissions of only one file, which is not monitored by
default on popular intrusion detection systems such as rkhunter,
chkrootkit, or samhain.
For better chances of success, this can be combined with the first
attack scenario, by inserting hidden gadgets in a non SUID open-
source program, which is much easier to achieve. This backdoored
program, embedding the hidden gadgets and a ROP exec vulnera-
bility, will be legitimately deployed on the target. Should a security
analyst audit the program before the attack, he will wrongly con-
clude that the vulnerability is not exploitable, hence not requiring
an urgent patch. After the attack has been discovered, even if a
forensics analyst comes across the program granted with SUID
permission, without the knowledge of the ROP-chain, he will waste
precious time and effort trying in vain to identify the mechanism
allowing privilege escalation.
4 INSERTING HIDDEN GADGETS
For the sake of realism, we intend to use code created by a standard
C compiler like gcc. We create exactly one function per gadget
(named function1, ...), each ending with a C return instruction.
For each function, the compiler may add assembly code at the begin-
ning and the end of the function whose purpose is to respectively
insert (save sequence) and remove (restore sequence) the call frame
from the stack, depending on whether a callee-saved register is
modified by the function. Inserting a nested call in the function is
an easy way to be sure that the compiler will emit these save and
restore sequences.
Indeed, the presence of a restore sequence is crucial for mounting
a ROP attack, as we need to tamper with the return address register
ra, which is callee-saved. Inserting malicious call frames into the
stack hence grants control over the program counter through ra.
In practice, a vast majority of functions do call other functions,
either in the program, or in any library. In our proof-of-concept
attack, we purposely added a call to a dummy function in every
gadget function. Other ROP variants using alternative control-flow
instructions such as indirect jumps or exceptions are beyond the
scope of this paper.
The malicious gadget is made of two LCSAJs, the first being hid-
den with code overlapping and the last being the legitimate restore
sequence. A detailed example for one of the gadgets is provided in
Fig. 5. The C code (using gcc -Os -fstack-protector-strong)
used to generate it is:
long long function15c (){
dummy();
dummy4 (( signed) 0x9932000 ,
0,
(signed) 0xa0212000 ,
(signed) 0x23371000);
return 0;}
The hidden instructions are directly written in C code, and fea-
ture one or two instructions followed by a jump to a relative offset.
2https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1166/
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Function15cMEP HEP
save sequenceaddi sp,sp ,-16
sd ra ,8(sp)
dummy calljal ra,dummy
overlapping code
lui a0 ,0x9932
lui a3 ,0 x23371
lui a2 ,0 xa0212
addi s3,a4 ,363
lui t1 ,0 x26372
jmp 0x8
instructions
mv a1,zero
jal ra,dummy4
restore sequence
ld ra ,8(sp)
mv a0,zero
addi sp,sp ,16
ret
Figure 5: Segmentation of the different code sequences present in function15c. The gadget is highlighted in gray.
In the example of Fig. 5, the MEP consists of two 32-bit I1 instruc-
tions followed by one I2 instruction, whereas the HEP comprises
two 32-bit I1 instruction followed by one 16-bit jump instruction.
Here, the jump is only 8 bytes off its target, but it is definitely
possible to modify this value to hide the overlapping LCSAJ any-
where, even in other functions. In this gadget, magic constants are
loaded into the arguments of a function. The other gadgets use a
mix of arithmetical and floating-point operations, as well as load
and stores instructions. To have a consistent output among different
compiler versions and environments, we forced register allocation
(using the register keyword), and prevented instruction reorder-
ing in the overlapping sequence. Magic constants as arguments of
the function cannot be prevented, as the opcode of a HEP instruc-
tion lies in the operand of the MEP instruction. However, many
source code obfuscation techniques may come to help here, such
as C-preprocessor [28] or lightweight constant blinding, hiding the
magic constants respectively until the preprocessing and constant
folding passes of the compiler.
5 CHAINING THE GADGETS
In the previous section, we described our method to build one
gadget hiding some I1 instructions. In our full privilege escalation
attack, we need to chain several of such gadgets together. We will
aim at spawning a root shell, by invoking two system calls, the first
being setuid(0) and the second execve("/bin/sh",0,0).
In RISC-V, each syscall requires the execution of a special in-
struction named ecall, with register a7 set to a value encoding
the call.3 For each call, one or several arguments may be passed,
in registers a0, a1, a2, ... The setuid syscall requires a7 to be set
to 146, and a0 to the desired userid, in our case zero. The execve
syscall requires register a7 to be set to 221 (0xdd), a1 and a2 to
zero, and a0 to point to the address of the string /bin/sh. The
next paragraphs explain how to achieve this result by using only
I1 instructions. We summarize the high-level overview of the ROP
3https://www.lurklurk.org/syscalls.html
chain in an assembly-like pseudocode in Fig. 6. The link to the full
source code is available in Appendix A.
Let us start by zeroing (resetting) a register. For this purpose, we
use the slti instruction (store less than immediate), that compares
its source register to a constant, and if lower resets the destination
register, else sets it to 1. By performing two slti instructions with
a negative immediate and with same source and destination register,
we are guaranteed to reset the register. In Fig. 6, this happens at
offset 88. We can then reset other registers by just performing an
slti with a zeroed source register and a negative immediate (offset
104).
The execution of an ecall instruction is trickier, as ecall < I1,2.
Hence, we must find an existing ecall and insert its location into
the stack, so that the program counter points to it after the execution
of the last gadget. If the program is statically compiled, this does not
raise any issue. However, in most operating systems, the program is
compiled dynamically, which results in every ecall instructions to
be located in the libraries. Consequently, in order to find the address
of such an instruction, we must outsmart the Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR), which loads the linked libraries at random
addresses. Randomized libraries are then linked to the program
through the Procedure Linkage Table (PLT), in which the dynamic
loader (ld.so) stores the randomized addresses of each external
function called by the program. The PLT itself is always stored in
the same memory area, statically known to the attacker (offset 48).
Programs compiled as Position Independent Executable with -fPIE
require an information leak to locate the PLT. By reading into the
PLT, we compute the address of our ecall instruction and write it
into the stack, so that the last gadget before the ecall will pop its
address and jump on it, triggering the syscall.
If a program uses the standard C library, then an initialization
function called __libc_start_main is systematically included in
the PLT. In version 2.27 of the library, there is an ecall at offset
220, making a perfect candidate for the execve syscall. However,
this instruction is not satisfactory enough for our setuid syscall, as
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.base
8 slti t2,t2 ,225
24 slti t2,t2 ,225 //t2:=1
40 slti t2,t2 ,225 //NOP
48 .plt_address +1823
56 slti a1,t2 ,-1999 //a1:=0
72 mul a4,t2,sp //a4:=.base +80
88 slti t2,t2 ,-1999 //t2:=0
104 slti a2,t2 ,-1999 //a2:=0
120 addi a4,a4 ,-1278
136 addi a4,a4 ,1275 //a4:=.base +77
152 addi t2,t2 ,-31 //t2:=-31
168 ld s6 ,-29(a4) //s6:=.plt +1823
184 ld s6 , -1823(s6)
//s6:= .__libc_start_main@libc
200 addi t1,s6 ,-1823
208 .ecall1_offset +1823
216 addi s11 ,t1,s2
//s11:= .setuid@libc :34
232 sd s11 ,315(a4) //.base+392<-s11
248 addi s3,a4 ,363 //s3:=.base +440
264 sd s3 ,307(a4)
//.base+384<-.base +440
280 sd s3 ,363(a4)
//.base+440<-.base +440
296 addi t1,s6 ,-1823
304 .ecall2_offset +1823
312 addi s11 ,t1,s2
//s11:= .setuid@libc :38
328 sd s11 ,411(a4) //.base+488<-s11
344 addi t2,t2 ,-31 //t2:=-62
360 addi t2,t2 ,-31 //t2:=-93
376 sltiu a0,t2 ,2017 //a0:=0
384 0 //.base +440
392 0 // ecall1 at .setuid@libc :34
440 0 // stack canary
456 addi a7,t2 ,314 //a7:=221
472 addi a0,a4 ,67 //a0:=.base +507
488 0 // ecall2 at .setuid@libc :38
507 "/bin/sh"
Figure 6: High level assembly description of the ROP chain.
The first column describes the offset (in bytes) relative to
the beginning of the ROP chain. Each instruction is hid-
den inside a gadget. As call-frames are at least 16 bytes
long, we omit the offsets of null value. The notation with
a leading dot .xxx@yyy:off designates the address of xxx
in yyy at offset off. The notation <- designates a mem-
ory store, and := an assignment. The .ecall1_offset+1823
indicates the location where we put the offset of the
ecall instruction in the setuid function of the C library
relative to the __libc_start_main function. Similarly, the
.plt_address+1823 indicates the location where the PLT ad-
dress should be inserted.
we need to continue the execution of our ROP chain after invoking
the syscall. Here, the candidate is part of an infinite loop.
Onemay think that jumping at the beginning of the setuid@libc
function of the C standard library may be a good idea. This is defi-
nitely not, as the function inserts its own call frame into the stack,
based on the value of ra at its entry. Since we already use ra to
hijack the control flow with ret instructions, the function would
return at its beginning, causing an infinite loop. Jump and link
instructions that could modify ra are inadequate as well, inasmuch
as they are detectable by Galileo.
Our solution involves jumping directly into the middle of the
setuid@libc function, making use of the instruction that sets regis-
ter a7 to 146 immediately followed by the ecall. As a downside, we
now must bypass gcc’s stack protector (SP), that enforces backward-
edge control-flow integrity, obliging the function to return to its
caller. Concretely, it checks whether the call frames have been
tampered with by generating a random number, the canary, at the
beginning of the function, and storing it in two different locations.
During the restore sequence, the two values are compared, and, if
different, the program aborts.
Howbeit, the other location at which the canary is stored is
pointed to by s0, which happens to be a callee-saved register, also
used by gcc as a frame pointer. Hence it may be possible to obtain
a gadget whose restore sequence pops s0 from the stack, which
allows hijacking the canary.We do so by writing at offset 384, which
smashes the value of s0, thence pointing both copies of the canary
to the same memory area. In this way, the canary test will always
pass, as both pointers are now aliased. Finally, the gadget at offset
232 inserts into the stack the address of the ecall in setuid@libc
using the location of __libc_start_main obtained through the
PLT.
The execve syscall is easier to prepare. We reset a2, and straight-
forwardly set a7 to 221. The gadget at offset 328 inserts into the
stack the address of the ecall candidate, also in setuid@libc. Note
that we do not need to bypass SP this time, as the execve syscall
will spawn a new process. Finally, we take advantage of the pre-
viously leaked stack pointer (at offset 72) to set a0 to the address
of the string /bin/sh, located after the last call frame of our ROP
chain.
6 ATTACK PROOF-OF-CONCEPT ON
DIFFERENT PLATFORMS
In this section, we experiment our attack on two Linux operating
systems, Debian and Fedora, running as a chroot environment
on a HiFive Unleashed development board, featuring a quad-core
Freedom U540 RV64GC processor.
6.1 Debian chroot on HiFive Unleashed
We first try our attack on the HiFive Unleashed board with a re-
duced Linux buildroot system shipped with the board. We add a
Debian chroot, allowing the access of Debian features within the
minimal operating system. Additionally, we create an unprivileged
user, setting up the stage for our attack. Given that there is no
gcc available on Debian RISC-V, we statically cross-compile the
binary from another host computer. Static compilation greatly sim-
plifies our attack, as all the libraries are now included within the
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Figure 7: The attack setup with the Hifive Unleashed board
featuring a Fedora chroot. A serial connection on the micro-
usb port allows a user-level access to the board. An SUID
executable in the user’s home directory allows a successful
privilege escalation attack, upon injecting the ROP chain
(cropped).
program, rendering ASLR ineffective. Nevertheless, we still use
-fstack-protector-strong, to harden the program against ROP
attacks.
Compared to previous scenario, we do not need to access the PLT
anymore. Instead we need to find an ecall in the program itself.
For this purpose, the function __internal_atexit is a perfect
candidate. Indeed it is always included by default in binaries using
the standard C library, and remarkably, falls through the cracks of
SP. We write new gadgets in handwritten assembly this time, and
adapt the ROP chain.
The test program embeds the gadgets, whose construction is
detailed in Section 4, and the ROP chain with some simplifica-
tions compared to Section 5. Finally, a function with a ROP exec
vulnerability is added to the program, whose sole purpose is to
grant the attacker the possibility to smash the stack, launching the
attack upon return. We use an assembly instruction that straight-
forwardly replaces the stack by the ROP chain, which produces
similar results as a buffer overflow vulnerability that arises from a
scanf("%s",buffer).
After setting the SUID permission using chmod u+s to the bi-
nary, the user logs in and executes the target program, successfully
spawning a root shell.
6.2 Fedora
We then moved to a Fedora 28 stage 4 disk image, another Linux
based OS with many more features. It has a package manager with
a gcc version 7.3.1 able to dynamically compile programs directly
on the board with a standard C library in version 2.27.4 Our attack
was successfully tested both on the RISC-V Fedora powered by a
QEMU virtual machine [8] and a Fedora chroot for Linux buildroot
running on the HiFive Unleashed board, shown in Fig. 7.
As we expected, we did not witness any difference between both
tests, as QEMU emulates a HiFive Unleashed RV64GC board, with-
out some of its micro-architectural features like caches or timings.
Moreover, in both cases, ASLR is set to conservative randomization
mode, which randomizes the stack, VDSO page, and shared memory
region position. The binary itself is not randomized, which creates
the opportunity of such code-reuse attacks. The data segment base
is located immediately after the end of the executable code segment.
We successfully bypass ASLR and SP, using the method presented
in Section 5.
Likewise, our test program embeds the malicious gadgets writ-
ten in C, the ROP chain and the ROP exec vulnerability. The pro-
gram is compiled by root using the standard gcc with options
-Os -fstack-protector-strong, and given SUID permission us-
ing chmod u+s. The user then logs in and executes the program,
again successfully escalating privilege.
7 PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we review different methods that could be imple-
mented to reduce the threat posed by the new gadgets described in
this paper, from the simplest to the most complex solutions. We also
provide a new algorithm for finding gadgets in RISC-V, that aims
at improving and replacing the Galileo algorithm in ROP gadget
finders.
Although we managed to bypass gcc’s SP, we believe that stack
canaries may still be useful, as they try to prevent stack smash-
ing, reducing the number of ROP exec vulnerabilities, and partial
function execution, reducing the number of MEP gadgets, thus
raising the cost for ROP attacks. In our attack scenario, even if SP
is deployed everywhere (using option -fstack-protector-all),
our gadgets are still able to jump over any canary check directly
on the restore sequence, rendering them ineffective. Therefore, we
recommend checking the canary immediately before the return
rather than at the beginning of the restore sequence, as done by
various CFI implementations.
In gcc, stack canaries are deployed using three different compi-
lation flags: -fstack-protector-all that adds stack canaries to
every function (but not to glue-code), -fstack-protector for only
the most vulnerable functions (calling alloca, or with buffer larger
than 8 bytes), and -fstack-protector-strong, introduced in 2012
that strikes a balance in between. Since Fedora 20, all packages are
compiled with the last option. Thus, compiling all SUID programs
with option -fstack-protector-all, as done on FreeBSD, can
prove to be a good mitigation, as it widens the gap between vul-
nerability and exploit by reducing the number of available gadgets.
Thence, an attacker would need to embed more hidden gadgets in
his payload, increasing the probability of being exposed.
4https://fedorapeople.org/groups/risc-v/disk-images/
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If we consider compiler-based backward-edge CFI variants like
LLVM-CFI,5 MCFI or Picon [14, 22, 33], the restore sequence may
be hardened in a way that may not allow reusing any part of it,
e.g. by putting the target validation guard between the return and
the assignment to ra from the stack. This leaves us with only the
last return instruction that can be jumped to from the HEP. Al-
though we hypothesize it may be possible to assign any value to
ra directly from the HEP, it is actually much easier to fall back on
the restore sequence of another function that is not protected by
compiler-based CFI, like glue-code. For the C standard library, the
__libc_csu_init function of crt1.o inserted by gcc and clang
is a perfect candidate, as it contains an unprotected restore se-
quence, even when compiled with SP (-fstack-protector-all)
and LLVM-CFI (-fsanitize=cfi on clang).
OpenBSD has its own SP version called RetGuard [31], running
on par with gadget reduction techniques, with the same shortcom-
ings as gcc’s SP. More generally, gadget reduction techniques like
G-Free [34] or code randomization [36] intend to eliminate any
unaligned indirect jump, relying on canaries or backward-edge CFI
to prevent malicious use of aligned branches, which is effective only
against gadgets having one LCSAJ. The new gadgets presented in
this paper fall out of reach of those mitigations.
To include this new class of gadgets in existing mitigation, we
would have combine them with a static analysis pass verifying that
every main and hidden execution path ending with an indirect jump
does go through the canary check (SP) or reaches target validation
(backward-edge CFI). For this purpose, we provide Algorithm 1
finding each and every execution path in a program. Its source
code is available in Appendix A. It tentatively disassembles one
instruction at every program byte, and checks whether it yields
a valid instruction. It then inserts these valid instructions into a
graph, whose nodes are defined by their addresses and the outgoing
edges by the values that the program counter might take after
the execution of the instruction. For example, conditional jumps
may have two outgoing edges, while data processing instructions
may only have one outgoing edge to the immediately following
instruction in the program.
Indirect jumps (like ret) do not have outgoing edges as the
value of the program counter may not be known statically. We
mark such instructions as Points of Interest (or PoI, term coined in
[50]), to keep only the instructions that can reach one of those PoIs.
Indeed, instruction sequences may only either reach a PoI, loop
indefinitely or trigger an invalid instruction causing the program
to crash. This can equivalently be rephrased as keeping only the
subgraph coreachable from those PoIs. Additional work can be
performed on this graph, like merging chains of nodes, yielding a
control-flow graph (CFG) showing both the MEP and HEP. We show
in Fig. 8 an example of such CFG.
We used this algorithm to find such gadgets in the C standard
library. Out of the 1957 unaligned sequences ending with a fixed
jump offset, only one can realistically be used as a gadget in a
traditional ROP attack. The scarcity of such gadgets on RISC-V
architecture confirms our need for magic constants when encoding
the gadgets in Section 4. Indeed the opcode of a HEP instruction
lies in the operand of the MEP instruction.
5https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrityDesign.html
Some more radical solutions would consist in trying to prevent
overlapping code in RISC-V, either by deleting the compressed
instruction C extension, or by requiring 32-bit instructions to be
naturally aligned, or by changing the ISA so that the length of
the instruction is encoded in first bit of every half-word. Though,
we may lose one bit per half-word, hampering with the range of
opcodes, i.e. less immediates, or less registers. Furthermore, this
requires extensive changes to the instruction set, and we believe
that such a solution could only be implemented on next generation
ISAs.
Input: B0, ...Bn , a binary program
Result: G, a directed graph of all execution paths
G
def
= (V ,E);
End
def
= ∅;
for pc def= 0 to n do
I := Disasm_one_inst(Bpc , ...);
if I is not a valid instruction then
continue
end
V .insert(pc);
foreach pc ′ in I .get_next_pc() do
E.insert(pc , pc ′)
end
if I is an indirect jump then
End .insert(pc)
end
end
G ′ def= coreachable(G, End) ;
return G ′;
Algorithm 1: Disassembly algorithm finding all execution paths
in a binary.
addi s3,a4,363
lui  t1,0x26372
j    0x8
ld   ra,8(sp)
mv   a0,zero
addi sp,sp,16
ret
lui  a0,0x9932
lui  a3,0x23371
lui  a2,0xa0212
mv   a1,zero
jal  ra,dummy4
dummy4
addi sp,sp,-16
sd   ra,8(sp)
jal  ra,dummy
dummy
Figure 8: The function15c (first presented in Fig. 5) as shown
by our disassembler. Unnecessary details such as instruction
addresses or hexadecimal representations have been deleted.
The gadget is highlighted in gray, and the dummy functions
are shown in light-gray.
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8 RELATEDWORK
Andriesse et al. [4] have shown a method to hide malicious code
using overlapping instructions in x86. It splits the code into smaller
fragments and bruteforces a prefix and a suffix, for which the code
fragment becomes a valid x86 MEP. This bruteforce method relies
on the high density of the x86 instruction set, although it still some-
times requires manual intervention to conceal the fragments. The
resulting hidden fragments are only one LCSAJ long, and always
end by an indirect jump, hence easily caught by any ROP gadget
searcher. Our approach allows better stealth by splitting the hidden
code over several LCSAJs, for which the bruteforce method may not
work anymore. We also apply our method to a RISC architecture,
which does not benefit from the same code density.
ROP attacks have been subject to many academic studies since
their first publication in 2007 [43] introducing the Galileo algo-
rithm. Many variants based on the same algorithm have been pub-
lished, like gadgets ending with indirect jumps [10], gadgets pop-
ping signal-contexts from the stack instead of call-frames [12], or
attacks using format string vulnerabilities [38]. Amongst popular
ROP gadget searchers, only two have added support for RISC-V -
xrop and Radare2 [3, 15], both of them implementing the Galileo
algorithm, falling short of detecting this new class of gadgets. The
closest to our work could be ROPgadget [42], which tentatively
disassembles a fixed number of instructions starting from each byte
of the program. This method is particularly inefficient compared
to our algorithm and to Galileo, but it could find some gadgets
spanning over several LCSAJs, if they are shorter than a given
threshold (by default 10 instructions). Quite surprisingly, after find-
ing them, ROPGadget discards those gadgets by default, unless
passed the option --multibr. The algorithm that we provided com-
prehensively solves this aspect of gadget detection by revealing
any gadget, whatever their length or number of LCSAJs is.
More recently, Borrello et al. [11] published a method to insert
backdoors in programs with encrypted ROP gadgets and a small
decryption procedure. While encryption methods provide a defin-
itive proof that the malicious behavior will indeed be hidden to
static analysis, this does not address the problem of detection, as the
decryption procedure is not concealed, and thus may be detected
by static analysis. In this paper, we provided another method for
adding such backdoors, without having any unconcealed element in
the program. To achieve this result, we rely on a fine understanding
of how current detectors work, exploiting their inability to find
gadgets spanning over more than one LCSAJ.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
ROP attacks still pose a threat, although despite the wide deploy-
ment of dedicated countermeasures. Those protections fail to pro-
vide a satisfactory solution to these attacks, as we managed to
design a new type of gadget on RISC-V, undetectable by existing
tools, made of several linear-code sequences and jumps, that by-
passes ASLR, DEP, stack canaries, G-Free and some compiler-based
backward-edge CFI. We showed how to use such gadgets in two
different attack schemes concealing a backdoor to perform priv-
ilege escalation attack on two standard Linux operating systems.
Although the gadgets are written in C, we believe that it can gener-
alize to other languages, such as JIT compilers once they become
available on RISC-V, as well as other architectures featuring code
overlap.
We provided a new algorithm aiming to replace previous Galileo
based algorithms, that manages to find all the hidden execution
paths of a program, and not just the last LCSAJ. This algorithm
may be used both for offensive and defensive purposes. However,
we believe that its defensive usage is only provisional, as a defini-
tive solution to prevent code overlap requires thorough changes
in the ISA, which may only be implemented on next-generation
architectures.
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A SOURCE CODE AND ARTIFACT
The C source code used for generating the gadgets, as well as the
images of the Fedora and Debian virtual machines are available on
the following link: ec2-13-58-4-171.us-east-2.compute.amazonaws.com
using password "AsiaCCS".
